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Abstract. The problem of disclosing private anonymous data has become 
increasingly serious particularly with the possibility of carrying out 
deanonymisation attacks on publishing data. The related work available in the 
literature is inadequate in terms of the number of techniques analysed, and is 
limited to certain contexts such as Online Social Networks. We survey a large 
number of state-of-the-art techniques of deanonymisation achieved in various 
methods and on different types of data. Our aim is to build a comprehensive 
understanding about the problem. For this survey, we propose a framework to 
guide a thorough analysis and classifications. We are interested in classifying 
deanonymisation approaches based on type and source of auxiliary information 
and on the structure of target datasets. Moreover, potential attacks, threats and 
some suggested assistive techniques are identified. This can inform the research 
in gaining an understanding of the deanonymisation problem and assist in the 
advancement of privacy protection.  
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1   Introduction 
Increasingly, the Web has become a world of interconnected information particularly 
in terms of social practices. People participate in different social platforms and post 
and publish their personal information and activities that are occasionally, and based 
on the context, set to be anonymous. They also consume other information from other 
platforms and applications such as government and commercial services through their 
social profiles. Governments and other institutional bodies are now releasing their 
data on the Web for transparency, accountability, economic, and service improvement 
purposes, among other reasons this extensive growth of the Web is continuously 
accompanied by increasing concerns about new threats to privacy, and this also 
applies to all other networking environments that depend on their private intranets or 
isolated databases. The key fact here about the threats to privacy is the enormous 
amounts of data that are increasingly available in different contextual forms.  
Here, we study the problem of data re-identification resulting from the rich 
availability of data from heterogeneous resources. We conduct a survey of the state-
of-the-art techniques of deanonymisation attacks. Our work extends similar work 
found in the literature; brief survey [1] on online social networks and another 
systematic review [2] of re-identification attacks on health data. In our survey, we 
include - on a large scale - recent techniques from various fields to provide a broad 
overview of the deanonymisation problem. 
1.1 Research Motivation 
This research is motivated by a number of issues. First, publishing data in the Web 
including personal data is becoming more advanced and growing immensely with a 
corresponding growth in publishable data links. Second, using online social networks, 
which include personal and private data. Third, mashup applications are also an issue 
in terms of collecting information from different platforms for third party interests. 
Fourth, the increasing concern about data leakage [3] [4]. Fifth, recent research has 
questioned the ability of anonymisation techniques to successfully preserve privacy 
[5-7]. Sixth, publishing open government data and the concern of jigsaw re-
identification problem regarding private data (transparent government may lead to 
transparent citizens in terms of their private personal information) [8]. Finally, 
Political and commercial interests for advancing open data and linked open data with 
low interests in discussing privacy issues and challenges about publishing data that 
may affect their business.  
Therefore, in considering all these issues that affect one context such as online 
social networks, it can be strongly inferred that the deanonymisation problem is more 
serious when considering all other different contexts.  
1.2  Survey Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to explore the deanonymisation problem and provide a 
broader conceptual view and understanding of how it - and all other issues related to 
this problem - occurs. In particular, it is important to understand how an adversary 
can exploit any data to use as background knowledge to achieve the deanonymisation 
attacks and what the possible threats are that result from that. This survey aims to 
provide analysis and classification for deanonymisation to include the broader 
audience of non-technical practitioners from legal and governmental fields. This is to 
help those interested to make sense of and understand the deanonymisation problem 
and how it might affect their decisions in terms of publishing data and protecting 
privacy rights.  
This survey includes large scale of deanonymisation techniques to provide a broad 
overview of deanonymisation. We conduct the following steps: First, we design a 
deanonymisation framework for analysing several techniques in different 
environments. Second, we classify deanonymisation approaches based on the 
appropriate methodology that the adversary follows to enable them to exploit 
auxiliary information with target data structure. 
1.3 Limitations 
This research does not study the information gained as background knowledge by the 
adversary from real world information. For instance, information gathered from work 
environments such as colleagues’ personal information, or neighborhood data 
regarding houses and population, any data that might be used and combined with 
other data to give meaningful information. That being the case, it is worth studying 
such scenarios. However, this is beyond of scope of our survey that focuses on 
published data.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section two we review the related 
work. In section three, we explain our research methodology for this survey. In 
section four, we introduce our deanonymisation framework for analysis, followed by 
classification of approaches and other related issues with more details in section five. 
In section six, we discuss our insights and present arguments, and then the paper is 
concluded in section seven. 
2 Related Work 
In this section, we first briefly overview data anonymisation and data 
deanonymisation to provide an outlook on privacy solutions and their possible 
violations. Subsequently, we present the existing survey studies on deanonymisation 
that are similar to our work and then we state the features that distinguish this paper 
from existing work in the remarks section.  
2.1  Data Anonymisation 
This technique is the most common method used to preserve data privacy by 
removing personal identifiable information (PII). This ensures eliminating the risk of 
private data disclosure while these anonymous data are being processed or 
transferring between systems or networks [9]. A number of anonymisation models 
were developed for protecting privacy such as k-anonymity [10-12], l-diversity [13] , 
[14] and t-closeness [15]. However, k-anonymity model is argued to ensure privacy 
[16]. 
2.2  Data Deanonymisation 
Narayanan et al [17] researched the problem of deanonymisation where disclosure of 
anonymous data succeeded. They could achieve structural and computational attacks 
exploiting auxiliary information from other data sources. A number of studies [18] 
and [19] have investigated this problem and proved their theoretical and practical 
results about threats of re-identification and linkability. Deanonymisation becomes 
serious and practical when the structure of the target dataset is known and where large 
amounts of auxiliary data can be exploited. 
2.3  Existing Surveys on Deanonymisation 
There are two studies in the literature that systematically reviewed a number of 
deanonymisation techniques in detail. The first study is a brief survey [1] of five 
deanonymisation studies in online social networks. The purpose of surveying this 
problem is to technically show how it is both possible and practical to deanonymise 
released data in online social networks. In this brief survey, Ding et al [1] unified the 
models of deanonymisation based on the feature matching between the data released 
in online social networks and the background knowledge acquired by the adversary. 
They also classified the five attacks of deanonymisation into two categories based on 
matching direction between released data D in online social networks and background 
knowledge K: mapping-based methods (match K against D) and guessing-based 
methods (match D against K).  
 The second study of related work [2] is a systematic review of re-identification 
attacks on health data and this was undertaken for slightly different purposes. It 
focused on re-identification attacks’ representation among health data and compared 
these attacks with other deanonymisation attacks on other types of data. Furthermore, 
the review computed the total proportion of all successfully re-identified records in 
these attacks and assessed whether this highlights shortcomings in existing de-
identification techniques. El Emam et al [2] reviewed 14 articles of deanonymisation 
attacks for evaluation against health regulations and de-identification standards. 
2.4  Remarks 
Our research is more focused on the methodology by which deanonymisation can be 
achieved. In this paper, we proposed a framework to guide an in-depth analysis of the 
current deanonymisation techniques in the literature. Moreover, we classify the 
deanonymisation approaches and provide lists of attacks, threats and assistive 
techniques.   
 The major features that distinguish our work from existing surveys are as follows. 
We extends the brief survey [1] for a more systematic and thorough review in terms 
of number of deanonymisation techniques and various contexts to include, and this 
review also generates differently based classifications. 
 Our survey is more comprehensive in that it includes a large-scale number from 
the state-of-the-art investigation of the deanonymisation problem including their five 
attacks. Moreover, we cover not only online social networks, but we also include 
open data, databases, traces data and mobile sensors, and other heterogeneous 
networks and datasets. Pertaining to the classification method, our work is much 
broader and takes into account the deanonymisation methodology of exploiting the 
background knowledge of the structure of the target dataset with auxiliary information 
acquired by the adversary and then, based on that, following a certain approach to 
achieve the attack. We also provide details of types of attacks to commit 
deanonymisation and resultant threats. Regarding the second review study [2], only 
four studies are included in our survey as the remaining studies do not have the data 
needed for our research framework for analysis and or do not satisfy and technical 
level that we are looking for. For instance, Bender et al [20] used cluster analysis for 
deanonymising register data of statistical agencies using survey data related to 
scientific purposes. Some few studies are reports relate to specific healthcare and 
legal bodies. 
 There are also more studies in the literature that researched deanonymisation [21-
27] but these are not included in our survey as they are for analysis and evaluation 
purposes.  
3 Research Methodology 
Here, we explain our methodology in conducting this survey pertaining to selecting 
research papers of deanonymisation techniques and the way we analyse them.  
3.1  Searching for Papers  
We followed certain criteria to search for papers and articles to include in our survey. 
We searched for academic literature from several online conference and journal 
databases: IEEE, ACM, Springer and Google Scholar. Key words used for searching 
are: deanonymisation, re-identification, anonymisation and privacy risks. As our 
survey is focused on technical mechanisms in which deanonymisation is achieved, we 
only consider papers that report novel methods for successful deanonymisation 
attacks and that provide practical and theoretical results.  
3.2  Methods of Analysis and Classifications 
Our survey aims to achieve a comprehensive understanding and conceptualising of 
deanonymisation. To achieve this objective, we provide a systematic review for a 
large scale of various types of deanonymisation techniques in heterogeneous 
environments. Hence, we propose a deanonymisation framework to analyse the state-
of-the-art techniques to understand all their related issues. The components of the 
framework will extract specific details from each technique to guide the analysis in 
reasoning how the deanonymisation is achieved in a specific way. Then we classify 
the deanonymisation approaches based on the analysis. We also provide classification 
for all possible attacks that practically perform the deanonymisation and assistive 
techniques that can help in achieving more effective deanonymisation. 
4 Deanonymisation Framework 
To survey the studies in the literature, a framework of all identified aspects of 
deanonymisation is designed for analysis and classifications. This framework is used 
as a guideline to understand the problem of deanonymisation and how it works in 
different contexts. The framework consists of major components as shown in figure 1; 
each of them reflects an essential stage of the deanonymisation process. 
In this section, we present our classifications on deanonymisation. The major part 
of our research in this survey is to understand how the adversary can use type and 
source of the auxiliary information with the structure of target dataset to form 
sufficient background knowledge, which in turn enables them to follow the most 
effective approach to achieve a successful deanonymisation attack. We also classify 
the type of attacks in the literature and the threats resulted from that. Moreover, we 
introduce all the assistive techniques that are used to boost the deanonymisation to be 
more effective. And we finally identify some of the adversary capabilities. 
4.1 Target Dataset 
This refers to the data source that the adversary is interested in attacking and is 
usually protected by anonymisation techniques. To achieve the deanonymisation 
attack, the adversary needs to pay attention to the following:  
a) Anonymisation techniques: to defeat it properly.   
b) Anonymised data: that they usually have interests to disclose it. 
c) Dataset structure: to configure the proper methodology and approaches of 
deanonymisation and what auxiliary information is needed for that.  
 





Fig. 1. Deanonymisation framework for analysis and classifications. 
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d) Data sparsity: which also has a relationship with data structure. Sparsity refers 
to the way in which data are populated through the Web and their relation with 
other data.  
In some cases this target dataset can be used as a source of auxiliary information 
that assists the adversary to gain a foundation from which to achieve the 
deanonymisation.  
4.2 Auxiliary Information 
The adversary usually needs background information as a requirement to start from a 
strong base in order to achieve the deanonymisation attack. Sometimes auxiliary 
information is extracted from the same target datasets where the attacker can 
manipulate it computationally. 
4.3 Deanonymisation Approaches 
When the adversary finds that they have enough background knowledge to carry out 
the attack, then next stage is to choose a proper approach. We analyse a methodology 
that the adversary intend to find and follow based on the background knowledge that 
they could acquire from auxiliary information and the structure of target dataset. As a 
result, the adversary decides the most appropriate approach to commit the 
deanonymisation. We emphasise on this part of the framework as it shows how much 
publishing certain data helps the adversary to find a way to exploit these data. 
Furthermore, this specifies how available data can be combined with other data to 
form meaningful data that reveal many values that are not taken into account during 
publishing. A traditional approach of deanonymisation is matching data from different 
resources to disclose the anonymised parts in one of these resources. Some 
approaches can be combined for complex deanonymisation attacks. More details 
about these approaches are presented in the next section.  
We classify deanonymisation approach as shown in figure 1 based on the way that 
the adversary uses to exploit the auxiliary information with the structure of target 
dataset to achieve the attack. The typical approach for deanonymisation is matching 
data in which auxiliary information is used for mapping with an anonymised target 
dataset. Therefore, any overlapping between information will act as a guide in 
revealing the hidden elements. The following approaches are taking unique form to 
perform the matching mission. 
Now, we explain each approach separately providing definitions, examples and 
comparisons. 
 
Graph matching: this approach constitutes the common form among online social 
networks as these networks consist of nodes and edges. As a large number of 
deanonymisation studies were undertaken on online social networks, graph matching 
represents the most common approach introduced here in this research. This 
approach, in general, focuses on two graphs from the same target domain or perhaps 
from two different domains. Both graphs are used for mapping tests between the 
shared anonymised nodes and measuring overlaps. Zhang et al [28] utilised this 
approach in heterogeneous networks.  
Graph topology in [18] which built on [29], refers to the graph structure as a major 
information to achieve deanonymisation. The study argues that privacy can be 
breached once its structure is revealed, as a standard technique of re-identification can 
be developed based on that. Here, graph topology that makes use of structural 
properties of social graphs adopts the following steps:   
a) Find the largest common sub-graph between a pair of ego nets; 
b) Focus on common nodes of two graphs that are in distance of 1-hop from the 
centre; and 
c) Utilise the degree distribution of nodes of social networks and observe the 1-
hop neighbourhood degree distribution of the common nodes, storing each 
node’s degrees in a list as a signature if matching signatures are found between 
a pair of nodes from the two graphs, those nodes are considered to be the same. 
It does not work with graphs where their common nodes are at distance of 2-
hop from the centre (one node in a pair, or both nodes in a pair) as in [30] 
which covers n-hop and therefore can deanonymise more data.  
Other studies [31] and [32]  rely on aggregating networks from Twitter and 
Flickr to build up an auxiliary background and therefore can perform the graph 
matching.  
Other studies [33] and [34] also use graph matching for deanonymisation. 
 
Seed  & grow: graph matching in some studies starts with a complex process called 
seeding to plant a node such as a user account in a social graph and then make it 
building up links with other nodes. This expansion process is called seed and grow in 
[35] and [36] . Narayanan et al [17]  described their seeding method in two steps: 
seed and propagation. They combined that with link prediction to strengthen their 
approach and can manage the graph evolution. That could deliver high accuracy and 
coverage for their attack. They used graph matching by crawling Flickr with scrubbed 
user identities. The first step is seed identification where they deanonymise a small 
number of nodes. These nodes are used in the second step, which is called 
propagation, as anchors to breed the deanonymisation to a large number of nodes. 
This study used auxiliary information from the same target domain, crawling Flickr, 
but generating an evolved version. Also these studies [31], [32], [37], [38] used 
seeding based deanonymisation techniques. Another study [39] presents a new graph 
matching algorithm that relies on smaller seeds than other methods. 
 
Threading: is another starting point for complex graph matching. Ding et al [40] 
utilised the threading method for correlating the sequential releases due to the rapid 
growth in dynamic social networks. Then they match these releases with eachother. 
 
Matching similarity: is an approach where attacks rely on similar features between 
the target dataset and auxiliary information to perform the matching. Gambs et al [41]  
performed their attack on geolocated databases. They used mobility traces to find 
distance similarities and then match them with the help of statistical predictors. 
Likewise, Ji et al [42] match similarity between social data and mobility traces data. 
Another study [43] used text similarity between resume and tweets. Moreover, some 
techniques use node similarity to match graphs in social networks [44]. 
 
Matching statistics: in this approach attacks depend on using statistics to map 
datasets.  In [45] the attack relies on the unique features of users’ data to perform 
matching statistics. All these features in this approach led to users being identified.   
 
Link-based classifiers: the second type of classifiers is link-based and group-based 
which use friendship and group membership to identify some private attributes as in 
[46]. 
 
Group-based classifiers: the second type of classifiers is group-based which use 
friendship and group membership to identify some private attributes as in [46]. Also 
the group-based classifier was combined with auxiliary information from the 
browsing history to identify users in social networks in [47].  
 
Similarity classifiers: The Classifiers approach depends on local features such as 
temporal activity, text, geographic, and social features to form similarity classifiers as 
in [48]. These classifiers predict whether or not two accounts from two different 
social platforms are belonging to the same individual by deciding on similarities 
between them. 
 
Sparsity-based: this technique is utilised to attack sparse data either high dimensional 
micro data or specified with certain relations such as location. Sparse data share 
comparatively few relationships. Lane et al [49] used activity stream of the target 
within anonymised sets of streams gathered from other users. They designed a two-
stage deanonymisation framework: the first stage follows activity relationship mining, 
which consist of rules that link various aspects of two captured activity types and can 
help to decide if two activities were probably achieved by the same individual or not. 
The second stage uses the SCORE algorithm: the adversary input the auxiliary info 
and a stream of one or more activity types of a single anonymised user. This attack 
focused on the risks of sharing data of inference-based representation. Another study 
[50] considers a hypothesis that deanonymisation improves due to database sparsity. 
It also considers another hypothesis that states if the auxiliary information consists of 
values matching with rare attributes of a target database, then the deanonymisation 
achieved is greater. Both hypotheses are observed and motivated by the heuristic 
deanonymisation of the study [19] that targets high-dimensional micro-data. Merener 
[50] suggests that to achieve a high level of deanonymisation in a less sparse 
database, using large auxiliary information is needed. Frankowski et al [51] shows 
that re-identification is possible in sparse related spaces when matching data. They 
test data available in movie mentions with another data in movie rating. They found 
that data relate to a specific item in both datasets can lead to deanonymising users 
participating in such datasets.  
 
Trail: The trail re-identification approach was developed for linking genomic data to 
their identified users whose records are publicly available in various databases. This 
method exploits the unique features of visited location and utilises visit pattern in 
distributed environment such as healthcare as in [52], [53]. Moreover, the concept of 
trail re-identification approach also includes deanonymising users by collecting 
network data and then mapping their anonymised traces with IP addresses [54]. 
Likewise, in [55] matching IP addresses with Tor hidden services using traffic 
analysis. Another technique of trail approach is tracking users by detecting their 
fingerprints in web browsers [56]. This method relies on visited web pages in the 
browser’s history.  
Table 1 summarises features that used to form each approach. 
Table 1.  Features utilised for exploitation in each approach.  
Deanonymisation  
approach 
Features to exploit Reference 
Graph matching Network structure [18], [28],[29], [30-34] 
Seed & grow Growing links into the target graph [17], [31],[32], [35-39] 
Threading Correlation between sequential release of dynamic OSN [40] 
Similarity matching Similarity of specific features for mapping [41-44] 
Statistical matching Statistics of unique features [45] 
Link-based classifiers Friendship membership for classification [46] 
Graph-based classifiers Group membership for classification [47] 
Similarity classifiers Similarity of local features for classification [48] 
Sparcity-based How data are sparse, high dimensional, microdata [49-51] 
Trail Unique features of visited location [52-56] 
 4.4 Deanonymisation Attacks 
Deanonymisation attacks take different forms based on the method that the adversary 
finds is most effective to exploit background information. Attacks can be inference, 
linkage, structural, and predictive, active or passive. One attack can be described as 
more than one of these forms. Some attacks are supported with assistive techniques 
for more effective deanonymisation.  
Deanonymisation attacks listed below are described in terms in the way it is 
committed. An attack may convey more than one description listed here.  
 
Inference attacks: is a major form of committing deanonymisation. In this attacks, the 
adversary tends to use some available information such as friendship or group 
relationship to infer sensitive properties that carry hidden values or behaviours [46], 
[41], [57]. Some techniques [58] use algorithms to infer about customers’ transactions 
using auxiliary information about them with temporal changes of recommender 
systems.  Danezis and Troncoso [59]  use Bayesian inference to have knowledge 
about communication patterns and profiles information of users.  
 
Linkage attacks: is another common form of practical deanonymisation attacks. In 
this attack, adversary can link auxiliary information of certain users with their 
anonymised records in a dataset [50], [22].  
 
Structural attacks: it is the typical method to deanonymise graph using its structure 
[24] ,[28], [60]. Structural based deanonymisation attacks are proved theoretically and 
empirically by quantification [61] that exploiting social network structures is enough 
and even more powerful than other attacks that use seeding knowledge. A novel 
technique called Grasshopper [38] shows also higher effectiveness of 
deanonymisation than other state-of-the-art algorithms of structural attacks using 
seeding knowledge. 
4.5 Deanonymisation Threats 
According to the survey study [1], there are two particular deanonymisation threats; 
identification and linkability. The first threat, identification, leads to re-identifying 
records, IDs, users, nodes, links and some private attributes. The second threat, 
linkability, leads to re-identifying some relationships between users or accounts from 
different networks belonging to a certain user that are meant to be anonymised. 
Sharma et al [3] list the threats of privacy disclosure as identity, link and content 
disclosures. 
The threats resulted from deanonymisation attacks are related to three major sets: 
identity, links and attributes. According to the survey study [1], there are two 
particular deanonymisation threats; identification and linkability. The first threat, 
identification, refers to any data disclosed to identify an identity of a user or any 
entity and also any attribute relates to them. Linkability refers to linking entities with 
links that meant to be anonymised or entities from different datasets. For instance, 
linking two accounts of a user from different resources with each other. There is 
another more specific classification [3] for privacy disclosure. We summarise this 
classification as follows. 
 
Identity disclosure: which refers to deanonymising a user identity that was 
anonymised by removing the PII or by assigning a pseudonym.  
 
Link disclosure: which refers to deanonymising relationships between users that 
meant to be hidden. This may be achieved by inference attack using observed links or 
users’ attributes.  
 
Content disclosure: which refers to revealing any anonymised data related to the 
target user such as address, email, etc.  
4.6 Assistive Techniques 
This part is critical as it shows how much some techniques can contribute to boost the 
deanonymisation attacks for more effectiveness.  
 
Link predictions: is a method that the adversary uses to bridge the gaps between 
auxiliary information and target dataset if they are from different resources and have 
less in common for matching [1], [17].  
 
Content analysis: is a method suggested in [1] for analysing a user’s content in online 
social networks. This content may display usefulness in terms of providing 
information about the structure or some attributes to advance the deanonymisation 
attacks.  
 
Spammer elimination: in online social networks there are users whom their accounts 
are created for spamming. Those accounts tend to make random links with other 
users. These developing edges may lower the effectiveness of deanonymisation 
attacks. Therefore, discovering and removing these spamming nodes may improve 
deanonymisation [1].  
 
Adversary capabilities: feature matching task is a major capability for an adversary to 
think of committing a deanonymisation attack [1]. Other technical capabilities include 
prediction and inference, which require computational, statistical or probabilistic 
skills to compute the feasibility of deanonymisation. 
4.7 Deanonymised Data 
There are no specific methods or standard metrics for measuring the disclosed data 
resulting from deanonymisation. Most of the studies we found in the literature report 
their results in statistics compared to the sample of data they tested with precision and 
recall. Therefore, it is hard to think about deanonymisation approaches in terms of 
their effectiveness in a comparable way. The surveys [1] and [2], although following a 
systematic process, do not agree over a standard metric that can be used to measure 
the effectiveness of deanonymisation approaches. 
5 Discussion 
The aim of this research is to understand the problem of deanonymisation 
comprehensively in different contexts. We proposed a framework for analysis and 
classifications to survey a number of studies in order to understand the 
deanonymisation problem comprehensively. We classified the approaches in which 
the deanonymisation is committed based on the available background. This shows a 
significant fact about how might trivial data from a resource can contribute to form 
feasible approaches to attack another anonymised data in totally different resource. 
That is why we conduct this survey to extend similar work in the literature in different 
contexts such as the Semantic Web. Among different approaches found in the 
literature, matching methodology represents the traditional way in which 
deanonymisation is carried out. It exploits different features in order to achieve the 
mapping and overlapping process and that basically depends on the structure of the 
target dataset and the auxiliary information. What we found in the literature that is 
some published data can be combined with totally different contextual data from other 
resources. Therefore, this shows the risk behind that which we do not expect. And that 
must affect the way we think in terms of widening our thinking about possible 
scenarios of attacks and threats.  Which in turns affect the decision making about 
publishing data and the privacy protection that must accompany such data.  
It is appealing to compare deanonymisation methods in terms of effectiveness and 
reported results. However, this not reasonable as every study has its own measures 
and the whole deanonymisation process depends on chosen methodology, methods, 
and features used from the auxiliary domain into the target domain. Approaches are 
very specific to the situation where these attacks achieved. Additionally, it is expected 
to be high expensive computationally if we think to test different parameters in 
deanonymisation experiments.  
Finally, we envisage the deanonymisation problem is more challenging with the 
evolution of the Web to include Linked Data, open data, and big data. This is due to 
the fact that the technologies advancing the Web to be more discoverable, linked and 
open is actually forming the requirements of deanonymisation attacks to be more 
possible and practical or even automated.  
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
We analysed the problem of deanonymisation and we classified its approaches, 
attacks and threats for a comprehensive understanding. The techniques in the 
literature show evidence that this problem may become more serious than we thought. 
This stimulated by advancement in technology from two angles. Firstly, the Web has 
become the environment for publishing, storing and sharing information from various 
resources covering and serving different fields. Secondly, recent researches argued 
that the challenge for preserving privacy is getting greater as the data leakage is 
highly possible in the Web. Therefore, matching data from heterogeneous resources is 
feasible and thus deanonymisation can be achieved successfully. Also, in isolated 
environments such as health care, which hold sensitive information, can be 
deanonymised using data from the Web such as open government data.  
In future work, we aim to model the attack patterns of deanonymisation. Also 
understanding how the changing context is affecting the effectiveness of 
deanonymisation. And if there are dead ends where deanonymisation cannot be 
achieved. More importantly, how to balance between providing a value from 
publishing data while protecting privacy from possible threats. This will advance 
research in data disclosure control and policy support.  
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